MATCH-UP: Matching Under Preferences

– Algorithms and Complexity


Accepted papers



·         P. Biro & E. McDermid, Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences.


·         K. Cechlárová & T. Fleiner, On the house allocation markets with duplicate houses.


·         N. Chen, N. Immorlica, A.R. Karlin, M. Mahdian & A. Rudra, Approximating matches made in heaven.


·         B.C. Dean & S. Munshi, Faster algorithms for stable allocation problems.


·         P. Eirinakis, D. Magos, I. Mourtos & P. Miliotis, Finding all stable pairs for the (many-to-many) stable matching


·         T. Fleiner, R.W. Irving & D.F. Manlove, An algorithm for a super stable roommates problem.


·         H. Halaburda, Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences.


·         K. Hamada, K. Iwama & S. Miyazaki, The hospitals/residents problem with quota lower bounds.


·         C-C. Huang, Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant.


·         E. Inarra, C. Larrea & E. Molis, The stability of the roommate problem revisited


·         T. Kavitha & M. Nasre, Optimal popular matchings.


·         Z. Kiraly, Better and simpler approximation algorithms for the stable marriage problem.


·         B. Klaus & F. Klijn, Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians.


·         H. Kobayashi & T. Matsui, Successful manipulation in stable marriage model with complete preference lists.


·         J. Wako, A note on existence and uniqueness of vNM stable sets in marriage games.